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SYNOPSIS 
A survey of over 1000 recent publications on Jesus’ resurrection reveals some intriguing trends. For example, after 
almost a century of virtual dormancy, some critical scholars have proposed a number of naturalistic alternative 
hypotheses to explain away Jesus’ resurrection. Similar to the situation at the end of the Nineteenth Century, the 
most popular response by critics today is that the disciples experienced some sort of subjective perceptions of Jesus, 
although He had not been raised from the dead. Hallucination (more properly termed subjective vision) hypotheses 
come in different varieties. Sometimes it is suggested that the resurrection appearances of Jesus were similar to the 
recent claims that the Virgin Mary has appeared. Other times, it is said that these subjective visions were normal 
responses to grief by Jesus’ disciples, or perhaps even due to a psychological disorder. All of these recent strategies 
have something else in common, too: each one fails by a large margin to explain the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection 
appearances. These inadequacies are due to an entire host of problems. This is the result even when these views are 
judged by critically accepted standards. In fact, perhaps the main reason why most scholars still hesitate to propose 
alternative scenarios to explain away the resurrection is that numerous historical critiques stand in the way of these 
naturalistic approaches. Even critical scholars usually agree. 
 
Naturalistic explanations of Jesus’ resurrection have existed as long as this event has been proclaimed. Several of 
these alternative approaches even appear in the Gospels themselves. It seems that both past and present skeptics, 
knowing that Christ’s resurrection lies at the heart of Christianity, have singled it out for special attack. In this article 
I will first provide historical perspective to this issue and make brief comments regarding the heyday of naturalistic 
theories in nineteenth-century theology. About 100 years ago, the hallucination hypothesis was the most popular 
critical position until it passed out of scholarly favor. Based on my recent survey of more than 1,000 publications on 
the subject of Jesus’ resurrection published between 1975 and the present, I will proceed to document the increased 
popularity of this hypothesis, focusing chiefly on the views of scholars during the past decade or two. Lastly, I will 
present a multifaceted critique of these positions, using only data that can be ascertained by critical means, which 
the vast majority of scholars will accept.1 
 
NATURALISTIC APPROACHES SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Publications from the end of the eighteenth through the nineteenth century provide the most examples of naturalistic 
theories regarding Jesus’ resurrection. In his classic volume documenting studies of the historical Jesus during this 
period, Albert Schweitzer chronicled many of these approaches. For example, an early attempt by Hermann 
Reimarus charged that Jesus’ disciples stole His dead body.2 Friedrich Schleiermacher favored the swoon theory, 
arguing that Jesus never died on the cross.3 David Strauss popularized the hallucination theory,4 and others such as 
Ernest Renan followed him.5 Otto Pfleiderer and others thought that legends explained much of the data.6 
 
A fascinating subplot is that many liberal scholars refuted competing hypotheses. Schleiermacher and Heinrich 
Paulus attacked various vision theories.7 Strauss is usually thought to have crushed the swoon thesis with his 
insightful analysis8 so that few scholars supported it after his critique.9 Even though he preferred the legend thesis, 
Pfleiderer even admitted that it could not fully explain the data for Jesus’ resurrection.10 
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During most of the twentieth century, there was comparatively little interest in naturalistic theories against Jesus’ 
resurrection. Those who rejected the historicity of this event seldom made reference to alternative formulations. 
After mentioning a lengthy list of critical theories, Raymond Brown indicated in 1967 that the “criticism of today 
does not follow the paths taken by the criticism of the past. No longer respectable are the crude theories...popular in 
the past century....Serious scholars pay little attention to these fictional reconstructions.”11 
 
This lull on the part of critical scholars occurred for more than one reason. Interest in many issues regarding the 
historical Jesus sagged during this period. Near the top of the list of reasons was the failure of naturalistic 
hypotheses to explain the known data. In other words, the chief reason for rejecting these alternative theories is that 
the facts refute each one. James D. G. Dunn concluded: “Alternative interpretations of the data fail to provide a 
more satisfactory explanation.”12 Philosopher Stephen Davis agrees that critics “are unable to come up with a 
coherent and plausible story that accounts for the evidence at hand. All of the alternative hypotheses with which I 
am familiar are historically weak; some are so weak that they collapse of their own weight once spelled out....the 
alternative theories that have been proposed are not only weaker but far weaker at explaining the available historical 
evidence.”13 
 
Despite these developments, at present there appears to be a limited trend toward rejuvenating some of the older 
attempts to explain the resurrection on naturalistic grounds. Of these, the most popular recent choice is a thesis that 
involves the earliest Christians having hallucinatory or other subjective experiences. 
 
THE RECENT RETURN OF THE HALLUCINATION HYPOTHESES 
In my survey of over 1,000 critical publications on the resurrection, more scholars apparently support various 
naturalistic hypotheses than has been the case in many decades. This phenomenon is not due to any change in the 
historical landscape. Rather, it is like the old saying — what goes around comes around — as if some scholars 
simply think it is time for a change. 
 
Of those who now prefer hallucination explanations, however, only a few scholars have pursued this approach in 
detail, while several other scholars simply mention the possibility of, or preference for, the hallucination thesis.14 
We will look at a few of these attempts. 
 
Gerd Lüdemann has recently outlined a case reminiscent of nineteenth-century attempts. He holds that this 
explanation can be applied to all of the chief participants in the earliest church: the disciples, Paul, the 500, and 
James, the brother of Jesus.15 Lüdemann asserts that Paul’s use of the term ophthe in 1 Corinthians 15:3ff clearly 
means that he was speaking of actual sight, of “his own active sensual perception...,” as well as that of the other 
apostles. So Paul “must have expected the Corinthians to understand the term historically.”16 Lüdemann concludes 
that hallucinatory visions are required, along with “auditory features” that produced a “stimulus,” “enthusiasm,” 
“religious intoxication,” and “ecstasy” for Peter. This spread to the other disciples by “an incomparable chain 
reaction.” Paul, the other apostles, 500 persons, and James all similarly experienced these subjective visions. The 
appearances were collective, amounting to a “mass ecstasy.”17 
 
Although his approach is quite different at points, Jack Kent also thinks hallucinations explain the claims 
of the disciples, Paul, and James.18 Kent combines two naturalistic theories to explain the resurrection 
appearances of Jesus. Jesus’ male and female followers experienced “normal, grief-related 
hallucinations.” Paul, on the other hand, experienced inward conflict and turbulence because he 
participated in the death of Stephen and because of his persecution of Christians. As a result, he 
underwent a “conversion disorder,” a recognized psychiatric malady that accounts for his conversion on 
the road to Damascus, which included his stumbling and blindness in particular.19 Unlike Lüdemann, 
however, Kent wishes to avoid collective hallucinations.20 
 
Closer to Kent, Michael Goulder applies a related explanation to the experiences of Peter, Paul, and some of the 
others.21 Goulder thinks that Peter and Paul experienced what he calls “conversion visions” — hallucinations of 
various sorts produced during times of great stress, guilt, and self-doubt. The result for these apostles, one of whom 
had denied his Lord and another who had persecuted Christians, was a new orientation to life — a 
transformation leading to “subsequent heroism and martyrdom.”22  
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One other approach I have dubbed “the illumination theory” should perhaps be mentioned briefly. Several recent 
scholars prefer a strategy that, while seemingly close to the hallucination thesis, is not quite the same. In general, the 
idea is that Peter was the first to have some sort of subjective experience or conviction that Jesus was alive. This was 
later communicated in some sense to Jesus’ other followers, who concluded that Jesus had risen. Critics contend that 
we cannot now speak about the historical nature of this incident. It is the faith of the early believers that is really of 
chief importance here, not the nature of the experiences.23 It is often remarked that these experiences were not 
hallucinations,24 but many of our criticisms below will still apply to this thesis. 
 
CRITIQUES OF THE HALLUCINATION HYPOTHESES 
While recent hallucination theories reveal some differences among them, there are more similarities. We will begin 
our critiques by evaluating the possibility of group hallucinations. Next, we will look at the conversion disorder 
thesis proposed by Kent and Goulder. Then we will examine additional problems with these subjective explanations 
of Jesus’ resurrection. 
 
Collective Hallucinations 
One of the central issues in this entire discussion concerns whether a group of people can witness the same 
hallucination. Most psychologists dispute that possibility. A rare attempt suggesting that collective hallucinations are 
possible, without any application to Jesus’ resurrection, is made by Leonard Zusne and Warren Jones. They point to 
phenomena such as claimed sightings of the Virgin Mary and other accompanying reports from groups of people. In 
cases such as these, “expectation” and “emotional excitement” are “a prerequisite for collective hallucinations.” In 
such groups, we see the “emotional contagion that so often takes place in crowds moved by strong emotions.…”25 
 
The idea of collective hallucinations, however, is highly problematic on several grounds: 
 
1. The chief examples of “collective hallucinations” provided by Zusne and Jones were religious group experiences 
such as with Marian apparitions. These examples simply beg the question whether such experiences could possibly 
be objective, or even supernatural, at least in some sense. In other words, why must a naturalistic, subjective 
explanation be assumed?26 This approach seems to rule out the apparitions in an a priori manner, before the data are 
considered. 
 
2. Furthermore, the collective hallucination thesis is unfalsifiable. It could be applied to purely natural, group 
sightings, simply calling them group hallucinations, too. Concerning this thesis, crucial epistemic criteria seem to be 
missing. It can be used to explain (away) almost any unusual occurrence. How do we determine normal occurrences 
from group hallucinations? 
 
3. Even if it could be established that groups of people experienced hallucinations, it does not mean that these 
experiences were therefore collective. If, as most psychologists assert, hallucinations are private, individual events, 
then how could groups share exactly the same subjective visual perception? Rather, it is much more likely that the 
phenomena in question are either illusions — perceptual misinterpretations of actual realities27 — or individual 
hallucinations. 
 
Moreover, the most serious problems result from comparing this thesis to the New Testament accounts of Jesus’ 
resurrection appearances. Here, the explanatory power of this hypothesis is severely challenged, since much of the 
data not only differs from, but actually contradicts, the necessary conditions for “collective hallucinations.” 
 
4. For instance (more examples will follow below), Zusne and Jones argue that “expectation” and “emotional 
excitement” are “prerequisites” before such group experiences can occur. In fact, expectation “plays the 
coordinating role”;28 but these necessary elements contradict the emotional state of the early witnesses of Jesus’ 
resurrection appearances. The early believers were confronted with the utter reality of the recent and unexpected 
death of their best friend, whom they had hoped would rescue Israel. As those events unfolded in a whirlwind of 
incidents that included Jesus’ physical beatings, crucifixion, and seeming abandonment, the normal response would 
have been fear, disillusionment, and depression. To suppose that these believers exhibited “expectation” and 
“emotional excitement” in the face of these stark circumstances would require responses on their part that would 
scarcely be exhibited at a funeral!  All indications are that Jesus’ disciples exhibited the very opposite emotions 
from what Zusne and Jones assert as being necessary for such hallucinations.  
 
CRI, P.O. Box 7000, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688 
Phone (949) 858-6100 and Fax (949) 858-6111 
 
4 
By comparison, the disciples’ experience was totally unlike those cases where pilgrims expressly traveled long 
distances, exuberantly gathering with the explicit desire to see something special, as in the Marian cases. There 
would seem to be extremely meager grounds for comparison here with Jesus’ disciples.29 
 
Many other crucial problems plague the thesis of group hallucinations, and we will pursue several more below. For 
now, we repeat that Zusne and Jones never even attempt to apply their approach to Jesus’ resurrection. Rather, they 
incredibly close their examination with the admission that group hallucinations have a “dubious status” because it is 
not possible to ascertain whether these individuals were actually hallucinating!30 
 
Conversion Disorder 
Kent has suggested that Paul experienced a “conversion disorder,” a psychological condition characterized by such 
physical symptoms as blindness or paralysis in the absence of specific neurological or medical causes. This was 
brought about by his inner turbulence, conflict, doubt, and guilt. Goulder agrees about Paul, but adds that Peter and 
others, including perhaps James, were also suffering from the same problem. 
 
Again, when we align their hypotheses with the known facts, multiple problems with their interpretation emerge:  
 
1. Initially, only Paul is known to have manifested any such symptoms. Goulder’s inclusion of the others is not 
factually grounded. 
 
2. The psychological profile provided for conversion disorder also strongly opposes an application to Paul, James, or 
Peter. It most frequently occurs in women (up to five times more often), adolescents and young adults, less-educated 
persons, people with low I.Q.s or low socioeconomic status, and combat personnel.31 Not a single characteristic 
applies to Paul and it would be difficult to prove them for the other two apostles. 
 
3. A major problem is that no evidence exists to posit the preconditions for such a disorder from what we know 
about Paul, and about James in particular. Critics agree that James was an unbeliever during Jesus’ earthly ministry 
(John 7:5; cf. Mark 3:21). We have no indication that James experienced the slightest inner conflict, doubt, or guilt 
concerning his previous rejection of Jesus’ teachings. Paul’s skepticism is even better known, since he persecuted 
early Christians (1 Cor. 15:9; Gal. 1:13, 23). We do not know of any guilt on Paul’s part either, for he considered his 
actions to have been both zealous and faultless (Phil. 3:4-6). In short, there is no indication of any prior desire for 
conversion by either of these men. To suppose otherwise is groundless. Paul and James are thus exceptionally poor 
candidates for this disorder. 
 
4 and 5. Here, we have two separate critiques, due to very different sets of circumstances. While the same cannot be 
said of Peter, there is no indication that either James or Paul longed to see Jesus. Their unbelief is a poor basis for 
producing hallucinations! James the skeptic and Paul the persecutor are exceptionally tough obstacles for the 
hallucination thesis. To say otherwise is mere conjecture apart from historical data. Not only are these two 
individuals poor candidates for hallucination, but we need both visual and auditory hallucinations, which stretches 
the case even further. These two phenomena are relatively uncommon occurrences.32 These two apostles, therefore, 
fail to qualify for the disorder in the first place, and even apart from this malady, they were additionally not 
predisposed to experience hallucinations. 
 
6. Neither does this hypothesis normally account for what would otherwise be considered delusions of 
grandeur — in this case, the apostles’ belief that God had imparted to them a global message that others must 
accept. It is unlikely that other delusions were involved here, occurring at precisely the same time. So the case is 
further weakened in that the thesis fails to explain all of the known data. 
 
Charging that these apostles were victims of conversion disorder simply does not fit the facts. It is clearly an over-
reliance on a hypothesis apart from the data, a theory not anchored to reality. It would be highly improbable for all 
of the necessary factors to converge simultaneously. Like the charge of mass hallucinations, it spawns more 
difficulties than it tries to solve. 
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Additional Problems 
Many other issues remain regarding the hallucination hypothesis: 
 
1. Even individual hallucinations are questionable for believers who felt despair at the unexpected death of Jesus just 
hours before. Their hopes and dreams had suddenly been dashed. Extreme grief, not exuberance, would have been 
their normal response. 
 
2. The wide variety of times and places that Jesus appeared, along with the differing mindsets of the witnesses, is 
another formidable obstacle. The accounts of men and women, hard-headed and soft-hearted alike, all believing that 
they saw Jesus, both indoors and outdoors, provide an insurmountable barrier for hallucinations. The odds that each 
person would be in precisely the proper and same frame of mind to experience a hallucination, even individually, 
decrease exponentially.33 
 
3. Generally, hallucinations do not transform lives. Studies indicate that even those who do hallucinate often 
disavow the experiences when others present have not seen the same thing.34 Critics acknowledge that Jesus’ 
disciples were transformed even to the point of being willing to die for their faith. No early text reports that any of 
them ever recanted. It is highly unlikely that this quality of conviction came about through false sensory perceptions 
without anyone rejecting it later. 
 
4. If the appearances were hallucinations, then opponents should have located Jesus’ body safely and securely in His 
grave just outside the city of Jerusalem. That body would undoubtedly be a rather large disclaimer to the disciples’ 
efforts to preach that Jesus was raised! Because the hallucination hypotheses do not even address the historical 
arguments for the empty tomb, another naturalistic thesis is required in order to do so. 
 
Still more issues weaken the hallucination hypothesis. While they are perhaps not as weighty, they nevertheless 
count: 
 
5. Why did the hallucinations stop after 40 days? Why didn’t they continue to spread to other believers, just as the 
other hallucinations had?  
 
6. The resurrection was the disciples’ central teaching, and we usually take extra care with what is closest to our 
hearts. This is what drove Paul to check out the nature of the gospel data with other key disciples on at least two 
occasions to make sure he was preaching the truth (Gal. 1:18–19; 2:1–10). He found that they were also speaking of 
Jesus’ appearances to them (1 Cor. 15:11).  
 
7. What about the natural human tendency to touch? Would not one of them ever discover, even in a single instance, 
that his or her best friend, seemingly standing perhaps just a few feet away, was not really there? 
 
8. The resurrection of a contemporary individual contradicted general Jewish theology, which held to a corporate 
resurrection at the end of time. So Jesus’ resurrection did not fit normal Jewish expectations, and most of the 
witnesses to Jesus’ bodily resurrection were Jewish. 
 
9. Finally, hallucinations of the extended sort required by this naturalistic theory are rare phenomena, chiefly 
occurring in circumstances that militate against Jesus’ disciples being the recipients.35 
 
“HE IS RISEN, INDEED” 
To sum up, after a century-long hiatus, a limited trend toward the reformulation of naturalistic approaches to Jesus’ 
resurrection has recently emerged. The hallucination and related subjective hypotheses are again the most popular 
among these approaches, as they were at the close of the nineteenth century. We have seen that these strategies have 
failed to explain the known, critically ascertained data on several fronts. Giving a total of 19 reasons, we have 
concluded that they fall far short in their attempt to provide an alternative to the New Testament proclamation. 
Clinical psychologist Gary Collins summarizes a few of the issues: “Hallucinations are individual occurrences. By 
their very nature only one person can see a given hallucination at a time. They certainly are not something which can 
be seen by a group of people....Since an hallucination exists only in this subjective, personal sense, it is obvious that 
others cannot witness it.”36 
 
In fact, the problems with this thesis are so serious that these recent critics “would have to go against much of the 
current psychiatric and psychological data about the nature of hallucinations.”37 These approaches are therefore at 
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odds with current scientific knowledge on this subject. To apply the hallucination and similar subjective theses to 
Jesus’ resurrection appearances is erroneous across several disciplines and at many points. These subjective theories 
fail just as thoroughly as did those of 100 years ago to undermine the proclamation on which Christian faith has 
stood firm for 2,000 years: Christ is risen. He is risen, indeed! 
 
Gary R. Habermas (Ph.D., Michigan State University) is Distinguished Professor of Apologetics and Philosophy at 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. Of his 21 books, nine are on the subject of Jesus’ resurrection. 
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